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PREFACE 
Welfare in the majority of rural communities is closely asso-
ciated with farm income. The level of farm income in typical rural 
areas is the dominant force in determining the volume of business, 
the demand for services and the employment base of towns. This 
study is directed toward improvement of economic opportunities in 
rural communities as affected by farm income. It deals with the 
conditions under which farmer bargaining power can increase farm 
income. 
In most industries, output and prices are determined by group 
action. The individual farmer, however, one of a large number of 
farmers producing a homogeneous product, can have no effect in 
setting market price. He is a ''price taker." If farmers were 
able to use group action or bargaining power in establishing the 
level of price and adjust marketings to the established prices, 
agriculture ·would conform more closely to other major industries. 
Recently, there has been renewed interest and proposed leg-
islation to give bargaining power a stronger foothold in agricul-
ture. This study has been made accordingly. It indicates con-
siderations involved when bargaining power is used to achieve con-
trol over prices for major agricultural commodities. Estimates 
are made of net farm income, consumer food cost and supply control 
required under simulated bargaining power programs to attain three 
alternative price levels. Estimates also are made of government 
payments required to maintain producer net incomes at levels of 
recent years for each of the alternative price levels. 
This study is one in a continuing series dealing with alter-
native farm policies. A number of alternative methods, programs 
or combinations of programs could be used to attain a desired price 
or income goal: farmer bargaining programs, annual land retirement 
programs, long-term land retirement programs, government purchase 
of excess cropland and others. Any of these programs can be used 
but each program has associated with it a different freedom of 
decision, location of production and retired cropland, geographic 
distribution of government payments and income, and regional lo-
cation of agricultural adjustments. It is information on these 
considerations and trade-offs that policy makers and the general 
public need for making choices among alternative policies and for 
improving rural welfare. 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, farmers have been "price takers" and have 
accepted prices determined in competitive markets for the commod-
ities they produce and sell. This condition of pr~cing results 
from the fact that agriculture is an industry of pure competition. 
The number of producers is so large and the proportion of market-
ings supplied by each is so small that the individual alone can 
have no effect on market prices. If he alone reduces output be-
cause prices are low, he has no discernible effect on prices and 
his income is reduced as he sells less at the same price. If mar-
ket prices are so low that he realizes inadequate returns on his 
resources, he has no way as an individual to increase prices. Be-
cause his commodity is homogeneous with that of other producers, 
the individual farmer has no effective means of charging prices 
higher than the market level. If, as an individual, he quotes 
a higher price for his output, buyers simply substitute the mar-
ketings of other producers at the competitively determined price. 
Agriculture is one of the few major economic sectors that op-
erate under these extreme conditions of pure competition. In most 
other industries, the number of producers is either so small or 
the product is sufficiently differentiated that the individual 
producer can affect price. If his product is highly differentiated, 
he can set the price, then adjust output to the level necessary 
to realize this price. In other words, he need not be a "price 
taker" but can determine his own price in line with the magnitude 
of consumer demand. Where the number of producers is few, a 
single firm may exercise the leadership in changing the level of 
prices to which other producers adjust their sales. 
This difference between the purely competitive nature of 
agricultural markets and the markets of other industries has long 
concerned farmers. Various groups of farmers and farm organiza-
tions have been interested in devices or programs to lift their 
marketings from a regime of pure competition so that they might 
establish prices and have buyers pay accordingly. Once accom-
plished, this procedure would place farmers more nearly in a 
marketing environment paralleling that of other major industries. 
In industries where prices are established by producers, with 
demand quantity then adjusting to the specified price level, com-
petition need not be eliminated. Even with only a few manufact-
urers of automobiles, competition has been strong in the long run 
and some producers have had to cease production accordingly. Or 
even under conditions of monopolistic competition for differenti-
ated products and services, competition prevails with respect to 
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price. 
If farmers were able to use group action to establish bar-
gaining power and circumvent the purely competitive nature of 
commodity markets, their pricing regime would conform more closely 
to that of other major sectors of the economy. This goal would 
be attainable, of course, only under conditions of supply control 
or management where marketings are restricted to levels consistent 
with demand and the established price. Competition would not be 
eliminated from the farming industry. Even if farmers did not 
compete with each other on the basis of commodity prices, they 
still would do so for land and other resources. 
The supply control and commodity price support programs admin-
istered by the federal government for the last 40 years have rep-
resented a major attempt to improve prices through reduction in 
output and marketings. Sources of farm income improvement under 
these pragrams have been (a) direct payments to farmers for re-
ducing acreage and output and (b) improved prices resulting from 
supply control. Under past programs competition within the farm-
ing industry has been reflected in higher land values as farmers 
bid against each for more land to realize the income benefits of 
farm programs and the scale economies associated with mechanized 
technology. 
A bargaining power program administered by farm organizations 
could, with effective supply control, place farming on the same 
footing as other industries, which already operate under a similar 
regime of price determination and output policy. This is one 
conceivable goal for farm groups. Its major economic difference 
from present programs, which provide price and income improvements 
through land retirement payments and price support mechanisms, 
would be in the level of prices attained and the amount of supply 
control exercised. Too, it could be used for farm commodities for 
which current government programs do not apply. 
This study has been made to estimate certain effects that 
would result under successful farm bargaining or market power pro-
grams. The program evaluated is one where farmers collectively 
might establish a price level and adjust output and marketings to 
levels leading to its attainment. Henceforth, in this report, we 
use the term bargaining power to denote the general program or 
approach under analysis. 
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OBJECTIVES 
Two important objectives of the study are: 
1. to determine the levels of bargained prices necessary for 
major agricultural commodities if farm income is to be 
maintained at recent or specified levels while price 
support and government diversion payments are absent; 
2. for alternative bargained price levels, to determine the 
amount of government payments still required to maintain 
net farm income at recent or specified levels. 
Auxiliary objectives of the study include estimation of quan-
tities that relate to these price and income levels. Major quan-
tities to be estimated include: (1) the level of supply control 
necessary to attain three alternative price levels for selected 
commodities, (2) the level of farm income attained under each price 
level, (3) the amount of government payments necessary to keep 
farm income at specified levels under each price level, (4) food 
costs under the alternative price levels, and (S) auxiliary data 
relating to the acreage, distribution and production of crops under 
the various alternatives outlined. 
Current farm programs already provide supply control and price 
maintenance at recent year levels. Farm income has been maintained 
or improved not only through these supply-price effects but also 
through direct payments to farmers for their participation in a-
creage reduction programs. A bargaining power program that attain-
ed the same level of prices and supply control without payments 
would result in reduced income, since government income sources 
would be eliminated. Hence, an objective of this study is to de-
termine the level of government payments required under a bargain-
ing power program to maintain specified levels of net farm income. 
INTEREST AND CONDITIONS OF BARGAINING POWER 
While agreement on the method of attainment has not been un-· 
animous, bargaining power to improve the economic position of agri-
culture has long been a common goal of farm groups.l/ 
lf For statements on bargaining power by the major farm organiza-
tions see National Farm Institute. Bargaining Power for 
' Farmers, Ames, Iowa State Univ. Press, 1968. 
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The over-all goal of bargaining power for farmers is the improve-
ment of the terms of trade of the farm sector with the rest of the 
economy.~/ To this end, bargaining power has been proposed to 
bring desired changes in both price and nonprice conditions of 
the market.l/ Four rather specific reasons why farm groups pro-
pose bargaining power as a means of maintenance or improving the 
economic environment of agriculture are: (1) Farmers want to re-
main the managers of agriculture. Farmers and farm organizations 
have become increasingly concerned about posed developments in the 
industry such as corporate and tax loss farming, vertical inte-
gration by processors, large-scale industrial farming units and 
broad acquisition of land resources by outside investors. (2) 
They want to widen markets for agricultural commodities. Before 
reliance on supply control, farmers looked to market development 
as a means of resolving economic pressures resulting from rapidly 
increasing supplies and low commodity prices. The P.L. 480 
program using food for international aid has provided a large 
increment in demand through this means. Farmers have sometimes 
expressed the belief that, if promotion programs were properly 
planned and implemented, even domestic demand for food could be 
enlarged considerably. A recent study on food consumption and 
demand raises questions about the magnitude of this opportunity. 
Egbert and Hiemstra's study provides estimates indicating that 
without a supply control program, domestic food demand would have 
to be increased by 25 percent to maintain farm prices and income 
at their present levels.i/ They further estimate that a $3.3 
billion increase in food consumption expenditures would only in-
crease food consumption by 2 percent. The limited opportunities 
in demand expansion thus lead major farm groups to suggest bargain-
ing power for other reasons. (3) Farmers want to establish higher 
and more stable prices through ability to decide on a price and to 
~/ George W. Ladd, Agricultural Bargaining Power, Ames, Iowa State 
Univ. Press, 1964, p. 13; and Ewell P. Roy, Collective Bargain-
ing in Agriculture, Danville, The Interstate Printers and Pub-
lishers, Inc., 1970, p. 4. 
ll For a discussion of the present scope of farmer bargaining in 
the United States, see Ewell P. Roy, Collective Bargaining in 
Agriculture, Danville, The Interstate Printers and Publishers, 
Inc., 1970, Chapter 2. 
i/ Alvin C. Egbert and Stephen J. Hiemstra, "Shifting Direct 
Government Payments from Agriculture to Poor People: Impacts 
on Food Consumption and Farm Income, 11 Agricultural Economics 
Research 21:61, July 1969. 
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adjust output to it. Because of the very low price elasticity of 
demand for farm products, an effective supply control program 
can result in increased net farm income. 21 (Therefore, an impor-
tant objective of this study is to estimate levels of production 
and income consistent with alternative price levels and supply con-
trol which might be attained through effective bargaining power 
programs). (4) Farmers want to improve terms of trade by effects 
on nonprice variables. Potentials include improving marketed 
grades and qualities of products, long-term contracts for greater 
certainty of markets and improved scheduling of marketings and 
plant deliveries to lessen seasonal price variations. 
Sources of Gain from and Conditions for Bargaining Power 
If farm income is to be increased through bargaining power, 
the increment to income must be drawn from consumers in the form 
of higher prices, from the processing sector through greater com-
petition or increased efficiency to lessen the marketing margin, 
or from the government in the form of legislation or payments to 
farmers. For the first two sources, specific conditions seem 
necessary to accomplish price changes and income transfers. These 
include: (1) long-term control over the supply of output so that 
market means are available to enforce and attain pricing goals, 
(2) recognition by the opposing participant (processor or handler) 
in the bargaining process of the bargaining strength and the 
bargaining agent of farm groups, (3) financial strength of members 
and their organization to bear costs of market withholdings or 
greatly restrained supplies to enforce market price goals, (4) 
participation of farmers with the vast majority of output so that 
l/ Price elasticity of demand refers to the change in quantity 
marketed or purchased (demanded) relative to a change in price, 
Demand is inelastic if a given percentage increase-in price is 
associated with a smaller percentage decrease in quantity 
demanded. Under an inelastic demand, a smaller quantity sell-
ing at a higher price thus will increase total market revenue. 
(For an elastic demand, quantity demanded changes by a larger 
percentage than price and a smaller output sold at a higher 
price will decrease total market revenue.) 
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"free loading" can be prevented by some farmers who might otherwise 
increase output and sales under more favorable prices and undermine 
the program, and (5) sufficient loyalty of members, or control over 
them, so that "free loading" does not arise.§} 
Effective long-run control over supply is the most important 
factor for successful bargaining as a means to price and income 
improvement in agriculture. Although the necessary proportion of 
output controlled depends on the product, supply control must be 
adequate to have important effects in the market and to be con-
sistent with the conditions of demand. For commodities such as 
wheat, corn, soybeans and other widely grown products, supply 
control poses a large and complex problem. These products are 
produced on a nationwide basis and effective supply control and 
bargaining must be organized accordingly. If not all producers 
are represented by the bargaining agent, means must exist to pre-
vent nonmembers from supplying the market. If all existing pro-
ducers are represented by the agent, successful outcome of the 
bargaining process may encourage new producers to begin supplying 
the market. These difficulties must be overcome in a framework 
such that the bargaining agent or association has legal authority 
and is not subject to prosecution under the antitrust laws. 
Recognition by the opposing participant (processor or handler) is 
essential for successful bargaining and is directly related to 
supply control. The opposing participant must not be able to 
turn to substitute sources of supply or to substitute products. 
Hence, unless the opposing participant finds it necessary to rec-
ognize the bargaining agent, group or association, bargaining 
attempts will be futile. The opposing participant must either 
enter into legal contracts to assure these conditions or he must 
be aware of the farmer association's ability to inflict financial 
penalties on the noncooperative plant, company or sector. 
Supply control contracts and other features of bargaining 
activities must apply simultaneously to all major food substitutes. 
Success is unlikely over time if bargaining power applies only to 
supply control and increased prices for beef but not for pork and 
poultry -- or for grain sorghum, but not for barley, corn and oats. 
§j For a more detailed breakdown of certain conditions, see Roy, 
Collective Bargaining in Agriculture, p. 47. 
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Hence, for wheat, feed grains, soybeans, beef, pork and other 
widely grown products, the bargaining program must be coordinated. 
Coordination becomes more difficult as producers become more 
scattered, specialized and less concerned about other product 
groups. Conflict among and within producer groups also may pre-
vail, especially where some are producers and others are users of 
a product, such as feed grains or feeder cattle. 
Consequently, the conditions of adequate supply control are 
the most important considerations in bargaining power to increase 
prices and income. As denoted elsewhere, these conditions seem 
those on which farmers are most reluctant to agree.l/ It is not, 
of course, bargaining power per se that has the promise of in-
creased prices and income. Rather it is the possibility that 
bargaining power can be used in conjunction with effective supply 
control to lead to price improvements. The fundamental problem 
of agriculture stems from the basic supply and demand conditions 
of agriculture; namely, the vast potential to rapidly increase 
supply and the highly inelastic domestic demand. These basic 
conditions of supply and demand, especially for wheat, feed grains, 
pork and similar products, will not disappear merely through the 
institution of bargaining associations.~/ The bargaining assoc-
iation must have effective control over supply in a manner that 
allows attainment and enforcement of price goals. If the primary 
goal is price improvement and a greater share of the marketing 
margin, then much more power and supply control must be in the 
hands of the bargaining group. If farmers want only improved 
marketing efficiency or improved product grading, less power is 
needed. In other words, bargaining for fringe benefits may be 
easier than bargaining for and insuring the conditions of higher 
prices. 
Price levels attained through bargaining processes may have 
important effects on imports and exports, or may need to be re-
lated closely to existing trade conditions and legislation. 
II E.M. Babb, "Bargaining Methods in Agriculture," in National 
Farm Institute, Bargaining Power for Farmers, Ames, Iowa State 
Univ. Press, 1968, p. 47. 
~/ See Sidney Hoos, "How Farmer Cooperative Bargaining Has Worked 
on the Pacific Coast," in National Farm Institute, Bargaining 
Power for Farmers, Ames, Iowa State Univ. Press, 1968, p. 58. 
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Higher prices cause farm products to be less competitive in world 
markets. High domestic prices encourage imports and require either 
a tariff or quota to control amounts imported. Greater trade bar- 91 
riers for imports generally lead to retaliation by other countries.-
The attainment of higher prices through bargaining power thus poses 
certain problems not encountered in the conventional supply control 
programs used over the last several decades. For certain products, 
there is even the threat of new substitute commodities if prices 
are pushed too high. 
Existing Laws and Bargaining Power in Agriculture 
Producers of farm products have long had a legal basis for 
organization of farm cooperatives.1Q/ The Clayton Act of 1914 
states that antitrust laws shall not be interpreted to forbid the 
existence and oper·ation of labor, agricultural or horticultural 
organizations not having capital stock or conducted for profit or 
to forbid or restrain members from carrying out the legitimate 
aims of tl1eir organizations. The Clayton Act provides exemption 
from the Sherman Act (antitrust law) for farm cooperatives. It 
applies, however, only to nonstock cooperatives and does not sanc-
tion farmer bargaining for product prices. 
The Capper-Volstead Act (1922) allows farm producers to join 
together in associations, cooperatives or otherwise, with or with-
out capital stock for the purpose of collectively processing, han-
dling or marketing their products. The Act empowers the Secretary 
of Agriculture to restrain any cooperative from monopolizing or 
restraining trade to the extent that the price of any agricultural 
product is unduly high. If the Secretary does not act, the Depart-
ment of Justice can bring prosecution under the Sherman Act or the 
~/ For a discussion of export and import problems, see Dale E. 
Hathaway, "How United States Price Policies Affect Imports and 
Exports," in National Farm Institute, Bargaining Power for 
Farmers, Ames, Iowa State Univ. Press, 1968, pp. 86-95. 
~/ See Roy, Collective Bargaining in Agriculture, Chapter 4; and 
Donald F. Turner, "Agricultural Cooperatives and Antitrust 
Laws," in Vernon W. Ruttan, Arley D. Waldo and James P. Houck 
(ed.), Agricultural Policy in an Affluent Society, Ne~..r York, 
W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1969, Part IV. 
9 
Clayton Act. The Act provides for cooperative marketing or bar-
gaining over the sale of agricultural products. Even though farmers 
may form cooperatives without violating the antitrust laws, once 
formed the cooperatives are treated like other businesses under 
the antitrust laws. Membership in the cooperatives must be vol-
untary. Although it permits farmers to bargain as a group, proc-
essors must bargain as individuals under present antitrust laws. 
The Act does not provide for legal recognition of farmer groups 
in the collective bargaining process as the Wagner Act does for 
organized labor. Hence, the Capper-Volstead Act allows voluntary 
bargaining or marketing organizations to exist, but once in ex-
istence does not provide for recognition by the opposing partic-
ipant or give monopoly power to the farmer group. 
The Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act (1937) authorizes 
the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into marketing orders with 
both producer associations or cooperatives and processors or han-
dlers tc promote the orderly marketing of farm products. The mar-
keting orders are exempt from antitrust laws but are not allowed for 
a number of commodities. Commodities excluded include: wheat, corn, 
cotton, soybeans, barley, milo, oats, rye, broilers, table eggs, 
livestock and a great many other products. The marketing orders 
establish minimum grades, standardization of containers, etc. The 
orders regulate the commodity flow to market, divert excess supplies 
to secondary markets (e.g., milk), prohibit unfair competitive 
methods and trade practices and establish projects for research 
and development. Two-thirds of the product producers must approve 
the marketing orders; over-all supervision is by the Secretary of 
Agriculture. The present laws do not allow restriction on market 
entry or production. As a result, it might be expected that any 
significant price increase will be removed in the long run by ex-
panded output of the product producers. However, the marketing 
orders do provide for orderly marketing of products included under 
the law (such as milk). 
The Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967 establishes stand-
ards of fair practices for handlers and processors who deal with 
farmers. The Act prohibits discrimination in any way against mem-
bers of a producer association. The Act does not prevent handlers 
and processors from choosing their customers unless the choice is 
based on the fact of membership in a producer association. Refusal 
to trade can be based on commercial reasons and the Act does not 
require a handler or processor to recognize a producer association. 
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Proposals for Strenghtening Bargaining Power in Agriculture 
Four major acts providing some legal authority for bargaining 
power in agriculture have been discussed. Those currently in 
existence would not give farmer groups or associations enough con-
trol over supply and price determination to attain expected goals 
of improved farm income. It is possible that more effective legal 
authorization could prevail at some time in the future. Numerous 
suggestions recently have been made for mechanisms that would 
strengthen the bargaining position of farmers. Some have proposed 
extending labor laws to agriculture, thus giving farmers an ele-
ment of monopoly power.ll/ Legislative proposals to improve farmer 
bargaining power fit into two categories:1ll (1) those that would 
amend existing legislation and (2) those that would replace or 
supplement exiscing legislation. Most of these two kinds of pro-
posals can be further subdivided into two types: (a) legislation 
without a mechanism for supply control and (b) legislation with a 
mechanism for supply control. We now discuss characteristics of 
these last two types of legislation. 
Wagner Type of Act for Farmers 
The Wagner Act of 1935 applying to industrial labor unions has 
been suggested as a model for agriculture. The basic parts of 
this legislation are: 
1. The National Labor Relations Board was established to carry 
out the aims of the Act through supervision of elections 
and certification of bargaining agents. 
2. Employers are required to recognize and bargain with 
certified unions and if an agreement cannot be reached, 
it must be submitted to arbitration. 
3. Unions are protected legally in their right to strike. 
l!l For an argument against this specific proposal, see Donald 
F. Turner, "Agricultural Cooperatives and the Antitrust 
Laws," in Vernon W. Ruttan, Arley D. Waldo and James P. 
Houck (ed.), Agricultural Policy in an Affluent Society 
New York, W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1969, p. 197. 
1ll See Roy, Collective Bargaining in Agriculture, Chapters 8 
and 9. 
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Proposals for a parallel act for agriculture have not in-
cluded supply control provisions. Hence, certain gains would be 
limited. If a high price is established in the bargaining process, 
difficulties would be encountered in controlling producer response 
and in maintaining discipline over membership. Supply control 
through voluntary agreements of producers would be complex for 
products, such as wheat, corn, soybeans, cattle and calves, etc., 
produced by hundreds of thousands of farmers in locations thou-
sands of miles apart. Especially for these products, some type of 
legally authorized supply control mechanism would seem necessary 
for success. 
Marketing Orders with Supply Control or Producer Marketing Boards 
The second type of proposed legislation has provisions for 
supply control. This proposed legislation would extend monopoly 
power to producers of products included in the law with regulation 
by the federal government. A law of this kind could be a sub-
stitute for present government farm programs. The basic principles 
of the supply control, bargaining proposals are: 
1. All producers of a given product would be forced to comply 
with actions or provisions voted by a majority of the 
producers. 
2. A board of directors for a producer marketing board would 
be appointed and (or) elected to: 
a. determine output levels. 
b. determine market price. 
c. establish policies for orderly marketing, grades, 
standards, etc. 
d. collect fees to cover expenses, supervise elections, 
enforce minimum prices, etc. 
An example of proposed legislation which includes these prin-
ciples is the Mondale Bill. 111 The Mondale Bill contains the 
following elements: 
lll 90th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Bill 2973, Introduced Feb-
ruary 15, 1968. Also see Roy, Collective Bargaining in 
Agriculture, p. 178. 
------ ~·---- -·-------------------------------
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1. The Bill would establish the National Agricultural Relations 
Board of five members appointed by the President with Sen-
ate approval. (The Board is analogous to the NLRB created 
by the Wagner Act of 1935 .) The Board would conduct a ref-
erendum to determine whether a producer marketing board 
should be established for a given product to negotiate 
price and nonprice conditions. The opposite participant 
(processor or handler) would also appoint a bpard. Con-
sumers would be represented and the three interests, pro-
ducers, processors and consumers, would meet and bargain 
in good faith. 
2. The price agreed upon by t~is bargaining process would be 
free from antitrust prosecution. 
3. Marketing controls would be available to limit supply. 
Another referendum would be called and if producers favored 
contruls, marketing allotments would be distributed. 
The Mondale Bill attempts to establish "a fair and reasonable 
price to producers." Included in this price are "(1) the direct 
cost of production including hired labor; (2) the reasonable value 
of the time, skill, and experience of the individual producing 
commodity or commodities; (3) a fair return upon essential inves-
ted capital; (4) continuation of the American family farm pattern 
of agricultural production; and (5) other appropriate factors in-
cluding compensation comparable with that of other persons engaged 
in other means of earriing a livelihood ••• ".!~/ Of course, farms of 
different sizes have different levels of production costs and what 
is a "fair".price for one producer may be "too low" for another. 
Conceptually, though, the bargaining process could establish a 
market price for every agricultural commodity. 
Our analysis that follows measures certain outcomes that might 
prevail if farmer bargaining power were to be exercised in attain-
ing certain levels of price and supply control. We recognize, as 
reviewed in the preceding discussion, that the necessary supply 
control and price administration is not easily attained under existing 
~ Senate Bill 2973. 
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legislation and the complex pattern of agriculture. Having re-
viewed these potentials and restraints, however, we now turn to 
the analysis of expected economic outcomes that could prevail if 
conditions should allow attainment of the appropriate level of 
supply control for the alternative price levels used in the study. 
ALTERNATIVES ANALYZED 
Products included in the analysis are: wheat, feed grains, soy-
beans, cotton, cattle and calves, hogs, sheep, broilers and tur-
keys. Three potential levels of bargained prices are evaluated for 
these major agricultural products. For brevity, these price levels 
are designated as Level A, Level B and Level C. For each price 
level, estimates are made of the resulting (a) level and location 
of production of wheat, feed grains, soybeans and ~otton, (b) 
net farm income, (c) government payments required to maintain net 
farm income at specified levels and (d) consumer food cost. Acreage 
quotas are imposed for the major crops to mesh supply with demand 
at each price level. The price levels studied are not recommended 
levels but have been selected among many possible as a base for 
the related estimates of production of major crops, net farm incomes, 
government costs and food costs. All estimates and projections are 
for 1975. Per capita income, population and yield coefficients 
have been projected to 1975 for the analysis. 
METHOD AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE ANALYSIS 
The analysis is based on results from a linear programming 
model with 150 producing regions and 31 demand or consuming regions. 
The model includes production activities for wheat, feed grains, 
soybeans and cotton.~/ For each price level studied, a set of 
projected per acre yields and costs was computed for each crop in 
each producing region. Total demand levels for wheat, feed grains, 
oilmeals and cotton at each price level were projected for each of 
the 31 consuming regions of the nation. Livestock production and 
demand are incorporated implicitly. (Demand for livestock products 
was converted into feed equivalents and included in the total de-
mands for wheat, feed grains and oilmeals.) The programming model 
was applied within the land restraints and demand levels specified 
for each producing and consuming region. The model then determined 
~/ For a description of the linear programming model used in this 
study see Appendix C. 
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the pattern of production that would maximize the net return from 
production of wheat, feed grains, soybeans and cotton, given the 
costs of producing these crops, their selling prices and costs of 
transportation among the various producing and consuming regions. 
Three Alternative Price Levels Studied 
Each of the price levels specified has a corresponding set 
of per capita consumptions and exports of wheat, feed grains, oil-
meals and cotton associated with it. Production of crops meets 
these specified levels of domestic and export demand estimated for 
each alternative price level. The same level of carry-over stocks 
for major commodities was used for the three price levels. The 
cropland base remains constant at 1965 magnitudes. Also, production 
quotas used in the bargaining power alternatives are not transfer-
able among regions. 
Farm prices of the commodities included in the study are pre-
sented in Table 1. The levels of production consistent with each 
price level and the prespecified domestic and.export demand were 
determined for each set of 1975 projected prices (i.e •• Level A, 
Level Band Level C). 
Under Level A prices in 1975, average prices received by farmers 
for all crops except cotton are near the 1966 level but are above 
1968 and 1969 actual. · The average farm price for all cattle and 
calves is between the 1968 and 1969 levels and the hog price falls 
between the 1966 and 1968 levels. Broiler price is above recent 
year levels and lamb price is near 1966 actual. For Level B and 
Level C prices, all crop and livestock prices are above average 
levels for recent years. 
Per Capita Consumption and Export Levels 
Per capita consumption estimates for beef and veal, pork and 
broilers for each price level used are summarized in Figure 1.~/ 
~/ Lamb and mutton consumption for price Levels A, B and C is 
3.6 pounds, 2.9 pounds and 2.5 pounds of carcass weight 
equivalent, respectively. Turkey consumption estimates are 
8.5 pounds ready-to-cook weight under Level A prices,and 8.3 
pounds and 8.1 pounds under Level Band Level C prices, respect-
ively. Egg consumption is held constant at 290 eggs per capita 
and dairy products at 566 pounds of milk equivalent per capita 
for all three price levels studied. 
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PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION; PROJECTED 1975 
AND ACTUAL 1969 
ACTUAL 
1969 
*FARM LEVEL PRICE 
BARGAINED PRICES BARGAINED PRICES BARGAINED PRICES 
A 1975 B 1975 C 1975 
Figure 1 
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The per capita quantities shown reflect consumer response to price 
at each level, based on existing knowledge of price elasticities 
of demand, plus trends relating to income growth. Under Level A 
prices in 1975, per capita consumption of beef and veal is near the 
1969 level (carcass weight equivalent).!I/ Consumption of pork is 
estimated at 8 pounds per person fewer (carcass weight equivalent) 
and per capita consumption of broilers is 5 pounds higher (ready-to-
cook weight) than the 1969 level. 
Under Level B prices, per capita consumption of beef and veal 
is estimated at 8 pounds fewer than under Level A prices. Pork con-
sumption is projected at 5 pounds per person fewer and broiler con-
sumption at 2 pounds per person more than under Level A prices. 
Under Level C prices in 1975, per capita consumption of beef 
and veal is estimated at 17 pounds fewer, pork at 9 pounds fewer 
and broilers at 5 pounds more than under Level A prices. 
lll Consumption of beef and veal under Level A prices in 1975 is 
below actual 1969 (Figure 1) even though, with Level A prices 
and an increase in ~ncome and changes in tastes between 1969 
and 1975, one would expect the 1975 per capita level to exceed 
1969 actual. But 1969 actual livestock prices, reported in 
Table 1, are in current dollars, not in 1966 equivalent dollars 
as are the 1975 prices. If the 1969 actual livestock prices 
(Table 1) are adjusted for inflation between 1966 and 1969 
(i.e., put in 1966 equivalent dollars) and assuming these ad-
justed prices prevail in 1975, given higher income and changes 
in tastes, per capita consumption of beef and veal in 1975 is 
estimated at 114 pounds. 
On the other hand, if we assume that prices in 1975 are at the 
same level as 1969 actual (i.e., assume 1969 livestock prices 
already are in 1966 equivalent dollars), per capita consumption 
of beef and veal is estimated at 111 pounds. If we assume 1966 
actual livestock prices prevail in 1975 (Table 1), per capita 
consumption of beef and veal is estimated at 118 pounds. Cor-
responding adjustments would also take place for pork and other 
livestock products. 
18 
Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 summarize export levels of wheat, feed 
grains, oilmeals and cotton for each price level included in the 
study. Wheat exports (including P.L. 480 or similar shipments) 
are assumed the same at all three price levels. Under the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement, wheat exports will be determined by inter-
country agreements and the price of wheat will not be the primary 
determinant of exports. As a result, wheat exports of 600 million 
bushels are used for all three price levels in 1975. Total wheat 
exports were 610 million bushels in 1969 (Figure 2). 
Exports of feed grains, oilmeals and cotton are more responsive 
to price changes. Under Level A prices, feed grains exports (corn 
equivalent) are estimated to be near the 1969 level. Under Level B 
prices, feed grains exports fall 3.5 million tons and under Level C 
prices, 8.5 milliou tons below exports under Level A prices. Feed 
grains exports totaled 19.6 million tons in 1969 (Figure 3). Under 
Level A prices in 1975, oilmeal exports are projected at 186 million 
bushels (soybean equivalent) fewer than the 1969 actual. Under 
Level B and Level C prices, exports are reduced 117 million and 311 
million bushels, respectively, below exports under Level A prices. 
Oilmeal exports were 886 million bushels in 1969 (Figure 4). ~/ 
Under Level A prices in 1975, exports of cotton lint are esti-
mated at 0.3 million bales fewer than 1969 actual. Under Level B 
prices, exports are 0.5 million and under Level C prices 1.5 million 
bales fewer than exports under Level A prices. Exports of cotton 
totaled 2.8 million bales in 1969 (Figure 5). 
PRODUCER EFFECTS 
This section summarizes the amount and location of wheat, feed 
grains, soybeans and cotton produced in 1975 under the three price 
levels used in the study. Also, for each price level, resulting 
net farm income and the level of government payment necessary to 
maintain producer income at specified levels are estimated. Ad-
ditional sections summarize consumer effects and other outcomes of 
interest to farm groups, administrators and the public generally 
when alternative means might be used to attain higher levels of 
farm prices. 
~/ See National Farm Institute, Bargaining Power for Farmers, p, 
96. According to Glenn H. Pogler, if the price of soybeans was 
$3.40 or $3.50 per bushel, the United States would lose a sub-
stantial part of its market. 
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WHEAT EXPORTS 
MIL. BUSHELS-----------......., 
600 600 
ACTUAL BARGAINED BARGAINED BARGAINED 
PRICES PRICES PRICES 
1969 A 1975 B 1975 C 1975 
Figure 2 
20 
FEED GRAINS EXPORTS 
CORN EQUIVALENT 
ACTUAL BARGAINED BARGAINED BARGAINED 
PRICES PRICES PRICES 
1969 A 1975 B 197~ C 197~ 
Figure 3 
21 
OILMEAL EXPORTS 
SOYBEAN EQUIVALENTS 
886 
700 
583 
389 
ACTUAL BARGAINED BARGAINED BARGAINED 
PRICES PRICES PRICES 
1969 A 1975 B 1975 C 1975 
Figure 4 
22 
COTTON EXPORTS 
MIL. BALES-----------, 
3 2.B 
ACTUAL BARGAINED BARGAINED BARGAINED 
PRICES PRICES PRICES 
1969 A 1975 B 1975 C 1975 
Figure 5 
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Acreages, Production and Yields for the United States 
Under Alternative Price Levels in 1975 
Table 2 shows the estimated 1975 acreages, production and 
yields of major crops for the United States for the three levels 
(Level A, Level B and Level C) of prices. Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 
summarize the regional location and distribution of all crops and 
each major crop for the corresponding prices. 
Wheat Effects 
Total wheat acres range between 43.2 million and 47.7 million 
acres under the three price levels. Total wheat production is 
lowest under Level C prices, slightly less than 1.5 billion bushels, 
and highest under Level B prices, slightly more than 1.5 billion 
bushels. M0re wheat is used for feed purposes under Level B prices 
than under the other two price levels. Consequently, wheat pro-
duction is higher.121 Wheat yield is estimated at 30.8 bushels per 
acre with Level A prices compared with 33.8 bushels per acre under 
Level C prices. Wheat acreage, production and yield for Level A 
prices are near 1969 actual levels (Table 2). 
Feed Grains Effects 
Acres of feed grains range from 76.3 million acres under Level 
C prices to 92.9 million acres under Level A prices. Production is 
estimated at 154.2 million tons of corn equivalent under Level C 
prices compared with 176.8 million tons under Level A prices. Since 
demands for feed grains, soybeans and cotton are more responsive to 
price change than is wheat demand, production of the former crops 
shows more variation under the three price levels. Feed grains yields 
range from 1.90 tons per acre under Level A prices to 2.02 tons per 
acre under Level C prices. Although under Level B prices feed 
grains production is similar to actual production in 1968, yield 
under Level B prices is higher and feed grains acres are substan-
tially lower than in 1968 (Table 2). 
12f Under Level B prices, farmers would find it profitable to use 
more wheat and less feed grains for feed purposes. 
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Soybean Effects 
Estimated soybean acres range from 25.7 million acres under 
Level C prices to 36.4 million acres under Level A prices. Pro-
duction of soybeans ranges from 0.8 billion bushels under Level C 
prices to slightly over 1.0 billion bushels under Level A prices. 
Estimated acreages of soybeans under all three price levels are 
below 1967-69 acreages. Soybean production under Level A prices 
is above 1967 actual and estimates for Level B and Level C prices 
are below 1967-69 quantities. Estimated yields for 1975 are all 
above 1967-69 levels (Table 2). 
Cotton Effects 
Cotton acreage ranges from 10.5 million acres under Level C 
prices to 13.3 million acres under Level A prices. Production is 
estimated at 11.0 million bales of cotton lint for Level C prices 
and 12.5 million bales for Level A prices. The lowest yield, 470 
pounds per acre, is estimated for Level A prices. Again Level C 
prices have the highest yield per acre. Estimated acreages and 
production of cotton for Level A and Level B prices are above 
1967-69 levels but are similar to 1968 and 1969 under Level C 
prices (Table 2). 
Regional Location and Distribution of Wheat, Feed Grains, 
Soybeans and Cotton in 1975 
Table 3 indicates the regional distribution of cropland used 
for all major crops. Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 indicate the regional 
distribution of wheat, feed grains, soybeans and cotton under the 
three alternative prices. The acreage shown in each instance is 
that estimated to restrain output to attain the specific price 
level. When prices rise, the incentive for producers to increase 
their output is stimulated. But when prices change, the quantities 
demanded of products also change. (In the complex of the model 
used there is both a change in demand and a change in quantity 
demanded.) 
The rank of acreages in the top four regions under the alter-
native 1975 prices is the same as 1969 actual: Corn Belt, Northern 
Plains, Southern Plains and Lake States (Table 3). Under Level A 
prices the Lake States, Corn Belt and Southeast regions have 
greater acreages of major crops than in 1969. All remaining regions 
have less. Under Level B and Level C prices, all of the 10 farm 
production regions have harvested acres below 1969 actual. 
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Total acres used for all major crops are 4.7 million below 1969 
actual under Level A prices, 23.3 million fewer under Level B prices 
and 39.3 million (20.2 percent) fewer under Level C prices. And 
59.0 million acres were retired under various government land retire-
ment programs in 1969. Similar comparisons can be made among the 
alternative 1975 prices. Total cropland used under Level B prices 
is 18.5 million acres fewer and under Level C prices, 34.5 million 
acres fewer than under Level A prices in 1975. As the price level 
rises, it becomes more and more profitable for all regions, in-
cluding marginal areas, to increase production. Naturally, given 
the nature of demand, acreage and production must decrease if higher 
price levels are to be attained and surplus stocks are not to 
accumulate. 
Acres of cropland required for major crops under an acreage 
quota, supply control program are substantially above requirements 
of alternative control programs. For example, with an unrestricted 
long-term land retirement program and production located in areas 
of greatest comparative advantage, 155 million acres would produce 
about the same level of output as 190 million acres do under Level 
A prices in Table 3.20/ Under the unrestricted land retirement pro-
gram, production shifts toward productive areas of the country and 
away from marginal producing regions. With acreage quotas based on 
historical crop acreage in a region to control output, this shift 
does not take place. Since land in marginal areas is lower yielding, 
more acres are required to produce a given level of output. 
Wheat Effects 
The change in total wheat acres as the price level varies is 
not large, since wheat exports are assumed not to respond to price 
changes (Table 4). Change in total wheat acres between the alter-
native 1975 prices is due primarily to the change in quantities of 
wheat that farmers use for feed. Under all levels of 1975 prices, 
the rank of wheat acres for the top four regions is: Northern Plains, 
Southern Plains, Mountain and the Corn Belt. The Southern Plains 
and Mountain are reversed from their positions in 1969 but the dif-
ference is small. 
20/ For a previous study using prices essentially the same as Level 
A of this study, see Howard C. Madsen, Earl 0. Heady and Kenneth 
J. Nicol, Trade-Offs in Farm Policy, CAED Rpt. 36, Center for 
Agricultural and Economic Development, Iowa State Univ., 1970. 
28 
Wheat acreage increases slightly in the Corn Belt as the price 
level rises, when compared with 1969 actual. But acres of wheat in 
the Corn Belt in 1969 were below earlier years. For example, wheat 
acres harvested in the Corn Belt totaled 5.2 million in 1965. 
Other regions, such as the Delta, show large percentage changes 
from 1969 but the absolute acreage changes are small. 
Feed Grains and Soybean Effects 
The total acres and distribution of feed grains and soybeans 
follow a pattern similar to total cropland use. Under the alter-
native 1975 prices, the rank of feed grains acres for the top four 
regions is the same as the 1969 actual: Corn Belt, Northern Plains, 
Lake States and the Southern Plains (Table 5). The Corn Belt, 
Appalachians and Lake States show an increase under Level A prices 
in feed grains over 1969, but 1969 acres were below previous year 
levels due to land retirement and supply control programs. 
As the price level rises, acreage quotas must be tightened to 
restrain output to market demand. Under Level A prices in 1975, 
total feed grains acres are 2.6 million below 1969 actual. Under 
Level C prices, feed grains acres are reduced 19.1 million (20.0 
percent) below 1969 when 59.0 million acres already were diverted 
from crop production. When prices increase from Level A to Level 
C, the largest acreage reduction takes place in the Corn Belt 
where nearly 8.0 million acres are removed from production. 
Under the three 1975 price levels, the rank of soybean acres 
for the top three regions is the same as 1969 actual: Corn Belt, 
Delta and Lake States. As with feed grains, acreage quotas must 
be tightened to restrain output as prices rise (Table 6). Under 
Level A prices, total soybean acres are 4.5 million below 1969 
actual. Under Level C prices, acres decline 15.2 million (37.2 
percent) below 1969. When prices rise from Level A to Level C, 
the Corn Belt again shows the largest acreage reduction with 6.5 
million acres removed from production. 
Cotton Effects 
Cotton output also must be restrained as prices increase. As 
the price increased from Level A to Level C, total cotton acres 
decline by 2.8 million (Table 7). Acres under Level C prices are 
6'34 thousand (5.7 percent) fewer than 1969 actual. Cotton acreage 
in 1969 was below that of 1965 when acres harvested totaled 13.8 
T
ab
le
 4
. 
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
o
f 
w
he
at
 a
c
re
s
 
fo
r 
th
e 
10
 f
ar
m
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
re
gi
on
s 
u
n
de
r 
th
e 
th
re
e 
a
lt
er
n
at
iv
e 
p
ri
ce
 l
ev
el
s 
in
 1
97
5 
w
it
h 
a
c
tu
a
l 
19
69
 f
or
 c
o
m
pa
ri
so
n.
 
19
69
 
a
/ 
A
ct
ua
l 
-
19
75
 P
ri
ce
 b
/ 
L
ev
el
 A
 
-
19
7S
 P
ri
ce
 c
/ 
L
ev
el
 B
 
-
C
ha
ng
e 
19
75
 P
ri
ce
 d
/ 
L
ev
el
 C
 
-
C
ha
ng
e 
T
ot
al
 
A
cr
es
 
T
ot
al
 
A
cr
es
 
C
ha
ng
e 
fr
om
 
19
69
 
T
ot
al
 
fr
om
 
T
ot
al
 
fr
om
 
R
eg
io
n 
A
cr
es
 
19
69
 
A
cr
es
 
19
69
 
(T
ho
us
an
d 
A
cr
es
) 
U
ni
te
d 
S
ta
te
s 
47
,5
55
 
47
,7
12
 
+
 
15
7 
46
 '9
03
 
65
2 
43
,2
00
 
-
4,
35
5 
N
or
th
ea
st
 
68
0 
87
3 
+
 
19
3 
77
6 
+
 
96
 
78
4 
+
 
10
4 
L
ak
e 
S
ta
te
s 
1'
 51
0 
2,
25
0 
+
 
74
0 
1 '
93
1 
+
 
42
1 
2,
08
7 
+
 
57
7 
C
or
n 
B
el
t 
4,
 34
5 
5,
95
0 
+
1,
60
5 
6,
06
2 
+
1,
71
7 
5,
61
4 
+
1 
,
26
9 
N
or
th
er
n 
P
la
in
s 
21
,3
11
 
19
 1
60
7 
-
1,
70
4 
19
,3
29
 
-
1,
98
2 
17
,2
57
 
-
4,
05
4 
A
pp
al
ac
hi
an
s 
77
6 
65
2 
12
4 
60
6 
17
0 
67
7 
99
 
S
ou
th
ea
st
 
29
0 
11
4 
17
6 
10
8 
18
2 
14
1 
14
9 
D
el
ta
 
46
4 
51
 
41
3 
51
 
41
3 
40
1 
63
 
So
ut
he
rn
 P
la
in
s 
7,
01
9 
7,
70
5 
+
 
68
6 
7,
70
5 
+
 
68
6 
6,
80
7 
21
2 
M
ou
nt
ai
n 
7,
55
5 
7,
23
8 
31
7 
7,
06
3 
49
2 
6,
51
5 
-
1,
04
0 
P
ac
if
ic
 
3,
60
5.
 
-
-
3_
.1
]2 _
_
 
-
33
3 
3,
27
2 
33
3 
2,
91
7 
68
8 
~/
 
So
ur
ce
: 
C
ro
p 
P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
19
69
 A
nn
ua
l 
Su
m
m
ar
y.
 
~/
 
C
or
n 
@
$1
.25
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 w
he
at
 @
$1
.50
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 s
o
yb
ea
ns
 @
$2
.75
 p
er
 b
us
he
l 
a
n
d 
c
o
tt
o
n
 
@
$0
.28
 p
er
 p
ou
nd
 i
n
 1
97
5.
 
c
/ 
C
or
n 
@
$1
.50
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 w
he
at
 @
$1
.85
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 
s
o
yb
ea
ns
 @
$3
.25
 p
er
 b
us
he
l 
a
n
d 
c
o
tt
o
n
 
-
@
$0
.31
 p
er
 p
ou
nd
 i
n
 1
97
5.
 
d/
 
C
or
n 
@
$1
.75
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 w
he
at
 @
$2
.20
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 
s
o
yb
ea
ns
 @
$3
.75
 p
er
 b
us
he
l 
a
n
d 
c
o
tt
o
n
 
-
@
$0
.34
 p
er
 p
ou
nd
 i
n
 1
97
5.
 
N
 
\.0
 
T
ab
le
 5
. 
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
o
f 
fe
ed
 g
ra
in
s 
a
c
re
s
 
fo
r 
th
e 
10
 
fa
rm
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
re
gi
on
s 
u
n
de
r 
th
e 
th
re
e 
a
lt
er
n
at
iv
e 
pr
ic
e 
le
ve
ls
 i
n
 1
97
5 
w
it
h 
a
c
tu
a
l 
19
69
 f
or
 c
o
m
pa
ri
so
n.
 
19
69
 a
/ 
A
ct
ua
l-
19
75
 P
ri
ce
b/
 
L
ev
el
 A
 
-
19
75
 P
ri
ce
c/
 
L
ev
el
 B
 
-
19
75
 ·
P
ri
ce
d/
 
L
ev
el
 C
 
-
C
ha
ng
e 
C
ha
ng
e 
C
ha
ng
e 
T
ot
al
 
T
ot
al
 
fr
om
 
T
ot
al
 
fr
om
 
T
ot
al
 
fr
om
 
R
eg
io
n 
A
cr
es
 
A
cr
es
 
19
69
 
A
cr
es
 
19
69
 
A
cr
es
 
19
69
 
(T
ho
us
an
d 
A
cr
es
) 
U
ni
te
d 
S
ta
te
s 
95
,4
27
 
92
,8
57
 
-
2,
57
0 
81
,5
14
 
-
13
,9
13
 
76
,3
13
 
-
19
,1
14
 
N
or
th
ea
st
 
3,
09
7 
3,
04
2 
55
 
2,
82
6 
27
1 
2,
59
1 
50
6 
La
ke
 S
ta
te
s 
13
,4
17
 
14
,2
73
 
+
 
85
6 
12
,1
08
 
-
1,
30
9 
11
,2
68
 
-
2'
 1
49
 
C
or
n 
B
el
t 
33
,1
32
 
35
,7
68
 
+
2,
63
6 
32
,0
66
 
-
1,
06
6 
28
,0
23
 
-
5 '
10
9 
N
or
th
er
n 
P
la
in
s 
21
,6
99
 
18
,7
97
 
-
2,
90
2 
16
,8
53
 
-
4,
84
6 
16
,5
78
 
-
5,
12
1 
A
pp
al
ac
hi
an
s 
3,
98
6 
4,
21
8 
+
 
23
2 
3,
87
6 
11
0 
3,
50
4 
48
2 
So
ut
he
as
t 
3,
08
2 
3,
09
7 
+
 
15
 
2,
32
9 
75
3 
2,
70
0 
38
2 
D
el
ta
 
77
9 
16
6 
61
3 
89
 
69
0 
23
5 
54
4 
So
ut
he
rn
 P
la
in
s 
8,
 71
1 
7,
09
2 
-
1,
16
9 
6,
38
1 
-
2,
33
0 
5,
73
2 
-
2,
97
9 
M
ou
nt
ai
n 
4,
66
6 
3,
89
6 
77
0 
3,
28
5 
-
1,
38
1 
3,
25
3 
-
1,
41
3 
P
ac
if
ic
 
2,
85
8 
2,
50
8 
-
35
0 
1,
70
1 
-
1,
15
7 
-~
42
9 
42
9 
~/
 
So
ur
ce
: 
C
ro
p 
P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
19
69
 A
nn
ua
l 
Su
m
m
ar
y.
 
b/
 
C
or
n 
@
$1
.25
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 w
he
at
 @
$1
.50
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 s
o
yb
ea
ns
 @
$2
.75
 p
er
 b
us
he
l 
a
n
d 
c
o
tt
o
n
 
-
@
$0
.28
 p
er
 p
ou
nd
 i
n 
19
75
. 
c
/ 
C
or
n 
@
$1
.50
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 w
he
at
 @
$1
.85
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 s
o
yb
ea
ns
 @
$3
.25
 p
er
 b
us
he
l 
a
n
d 
c
o
tt
o
n
 
-
@
$0
.31
 p
er
 p
ou
nd
 i
n
 1
97
5.
 
~/
 
C
or
n 
@
$1
.75
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 w
he
at
 @
$2
.20
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 s
o
yb
ea
ns
 @
$3
.75
 p
er
 b
us
he
l 
a
n
d 
c
o
tt
o
n
 
@
$0
.34
 p
er
 p
ou
nd
 i
n
 1
97
5.
 
w
 
0 
T
ab
le
 6
, 
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
o
f 
so
yb
ea
n 
a
c
re
s
 
fo
r 
th
e 
10
 f
ar
m
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
re
gi
on
s 
u
n
de
r 
th
e 
th
re
e 
a
lt
er
na
ti
ve
 p
ri
ce
 l
ev
el
s 
in
 1
97
5 
w
it
h 
a
c
tu
a
l 
19
69
 f
or
 c
o
m
pa
ri
so
n.
 
19
69
 
19
75
 P
ri
ce
 b
/ 
19
75
 P
ri
ce
 £
./ 
19
75
 P
ri
ce
 d
/ 
Act
ual
~/ 
L
ev
el
 A
 
-
L
ev
el
 B
 
L
ev
el
 C
 
-
Ch
an
ge
 
Ch
a\1
ge
 
C
ha
ng
e 
T
ot
al
 
T
ot
al
 
fr
om
 
T
ot
al
 
fr
')m
 
T
ot
al
 
fr
om
 
R
eg
io
n 
A
cr
es
 
A
cr
es
 
19
69
 
A
cr
es
 
19
69
 
A
cr
es
 
19
69
 
(T
ho
us
an
d 
A
cr
es
) 
U
ni
te
d 
S
ta
te
s 
40
,8
57
 
36
,3
62
 
-
4,
49
5 
31
,3
51
 
-
9,
50
6 
25
,6
71
 
-
15
' 1
86
 
N
or
th
ea
st
 
44
3 
30
4 
-
13
9 
26
5 
-
17
8 
20
6 
-
23
7 
La
ke
 S
ta
te
s 
3,
85
5 
4,
12
7 
+
 
27
2 
3,
25
5 
-
60
0 
2,
62
5 
-
1,
23
0 
C
or
n 
B
el
t 
20
,6
51
 
19
,3
78
 
-
1,
27
3 
16
,5
21
 
-
4,
13
0 
12
,9
47
 
-
7,
70
4 
N
or
th
er
n 
P
la
in
s 
2,
10
8 
2,
20
1 
+
 
93
 
1,
86
2 
-
24
6 
1,
47
4 
-
63
4 
A
pp
al
ac
hi
an
s 
2,
97
2 
2,
07
5 
-
87
5 
1,
71
9 
-
1,
25
3 
1,
65
8 
-
1,
31
4 
So
ut
he
as
t 
2,
23
6 
2,
08
4 
-
15
2 
1,
74
0 
-
49
6 
1,
45
7 
-
77
9 
D
el
ta
 
8,
12
6 
5,
90
8 
-
2,
21
8 
5,
 77
0 
-
2,
35
6 
5,
10
8 
-
3,
01
8 
So
ut
he
rn
 P
la
in
s 
46
6 
28
5 
-
18
1 
21
9 
-
24
7 
19
6 
-
27
0 
M
ou
nt
ai
n 
P
ac
if
ic
 
~ 
So
ur
ce
: 
Cr
op
 P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
19
69
 A
nn
ua
l 
Su
m
m
ar
y.
 
'p
j 
C
or
n 
@
$1
.25
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 w
he
at
 @
$1
.50
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 s
o
yb
ea
ns
 @
$2
.75
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 a
n
d 
c
o
tt
o
n
 
@
$0
.28
 p
er
 p
ou
nd
 i
n 
19
75
. 
c
/ 
C
or
n 
@
$1
.50
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 w
he
at
 @
$1
.85
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 s
o
yb
ea
ns
 @
$3
.25
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 a
n
d 
c
o
tt
o
n
 
-
@
$0
.31
 p
er
 p
ou
nd
 i
n 
19
75
, 
d/
 
C
or
n 
@
$1
.75
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 w
he
at
 @
$2
.20
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 s
o
yb
ea
ns
 @
$3
.75
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 a
n
d 
c
o
tt
o
n
_
 
-
@
$0
.34
 p
er
 p
ou
nd
 i
n 
19
75
. 
w
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
T
ab
le
 7
. 
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
o
f 
c
o
tt
o
n
 a
c
re
s
 
fo
r 
th
e 
10
 
fa
rm
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
re
gi
on
s 
u
n
de
r 
th
e 
th
re
e 
a
lt
er
n
at
iv
e 
pr
ic
e 
le
ve
ls
 i
n 
19
75
 w
it
h 
a
c
tu
a
l 
19
69
 f
or
 c
o
m
pa
ri
so
n.
 
19
69
 a
/ 
19
75
 P
ri
ce
b/
 
19
75
 P
ri
ce
 s
f 
19
75
 P
ri
ce
 d
/ 
A
ct
ua
l-
L
ev
el
 A
 
-
L
ev
el
 B
 
L
ev
el
 C
 
-
C
ha
ng
e 
C
ha
ng
e 
C
ha
ng
e 
T
ot
al
 
T
ot
al
 
fr
om
 
T
ot
al
 
fr
om
 
T
ot
al
 
fr
om
 
R
eg
io
n 
A
cr
es
 
A
cr
es
 
19
69
 
A
cr
es
 
19
69
 
A
cr
es
 
19
69
 
(T
ho
us
an
d 
A
cr
es
) 
U
ni
te
d 
S
ta
te
s 
11
,0
94
 
13
,2
60
 
+
2,
16
6 
11
,9
09
 
+
81
5 
10
,4
60
 
-
63
4 
N
or
th
ea
st
 
La
ke
 S
ta
te
s 
C
or
n 
B
el
t 
30
5 
43
 
-
26
2 
28
0 
-
25
 
23
8 
-
67
 
N
or
th
er
n 
P
la
in
s 
A
pp
al
ac
hi
an
s 
58
6 
94
6 
+
 
36
0 
62
0 
+
 
34
 
57
8 
-
8 
So
ut
he
as
t 
1,
22
9 
1,
99
3 
+
 
76
4 
1,
31
6 
+
 
87
 
1,
36
0 
+
13
1 
D
el
ta
 
2,
67
0 
3,
07
3 
+
 
40
3 
2,
89
5 
+
22
5 
2,
47
0 
-
20
0 
So
ut
he
rn
 P
la
in
s 
5,
14
1 
5,
96
3 
+
 
82
2 
5,
61
7 
+
47
6 
4,
78
1 
-
36
0 
M
ou
nt
ai
n 
45
8 
59
3 
+
 
13
5 
56
8 
+
11
0 
50
8 
+
5
0
 
P
ac
if
ic
 
70
5 
64
9 
-
56
 
61
3 
-
92
 
52
5 
-
18
0 
~/
 
So
ur
ce
: 
C
ro
p 
P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
19
69
 A
nn
ua
l 
Su
m
m
ar
y.
 
~I
 
C
or
n 
@
$1
.25
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 w
he
at
 @
$1
.50
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 s
o
yb
ea
ns
 @
$2
.75
 p
er
 b
us
he
l 
a
n
d 
c
o
tt
o
n
 
@
$0
.28
 p
er
 p
ou
nd
 i
n 
19
75
. 
s.
l 
C
or
n 
@
$1
.50
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 w
he
at
 @
$1
.85
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 s
o
yb
ea
ns
 @
$3
.25
 p
er
 b
us
he
l 
a
n
d 
c
o
tt
o
n
 
@
$0
.31
 p
er
 p
ou
nd
 i
n
 1
97
5.
 
~I
 
C
or
n 
@
$1
.75
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 w
he
at
 @
$2
.20
 p
er
 b
us
he
l,
 s
o
yb
ea
ns
 @
$3
.75
 p
er
 b
us
he
l 
a
n
d 
c
o
tt
o
n
 
@
$0
.34
 p
er
 p
ou
nd
 i
n 
19
75
. 
I.J
.l 
N
 
33 
million. (Cotton production was controlled by the Cotton Program 
in 1969.) 
Net Farm Incomes in 1975 
The level of net farm income associated with each price level 
is indicated in Table 8.~/ Net farm income ranges from $13.9 
billion under Level A prices to $22.7 billion under Level C prices. 
A fourth alternative, an annual land retirement program with govern-
ment payments to farmers for participation, has been included in 
the table for comparison. The price level assumed under this pro-
gram, termed Comparison Level prices, is below that of Level A. 
Net farm income is higher, however, because of the land retirement 
payments.~/ 
Income Comparisons and Government Payments 
Estintated net farm income of $13,9 billion under Level A prices 
compares with actual net income of $16.3 billion in 1966, $15.1 
billion in 1968 and $16.5 billion in 1969. The net farm income cal-
culated for Level A prices (as well as for the other two levels) 
does not include any government payments to farmers. Calculations 
were first made to determine the level of net farm income under 
three potential levels of prices where bargaining power alone (with-
out government payments) is used as the method of price improvement 
(Table 8). Then estimates were made of the amount of government 
payments necessary to maintain a specified level of net farm income 
(Table 9). Hence, to maintain net income at the 1966 actual level 
under Level A prices would require government subsidy payments to 
farmers of $2.4 billion (Table 9). Payments of $1.3 billion would 
be required to maintain net income at the 1968 actual level and pay-
ments of $2.6 billion would be required for the 1969 actual level. 
Under Level B prices, 1975 net income is estimated at $18.7 
billion,an amount higher than the actual level in any previous year. 
Under Level C prices, net income is estimated at $22.7 billion. 
Government payments to farmers for supply control and income support 
are not included for the last two price levels. However, foreign 
trade in terms of exports is reduced and consumer food costs, as 
reported in a following section, are somewhat higher. 
~/ See Appendix A for method used to estimate cash expenses. 
~/ For estimates of income and production effects under this lower 
price level and alternative long-term land retirement programs, 
see Madsen, Heady and Nicol, Trade-Offs in Farm Policy. 
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Table 9. Government payments required to maintain net farm income 
at recent year levels under a bargaining power program 
in 1975. 
1975 Prices 
Level A Level B Level C 
(:r~1illion Dollars) 
Net Farm Income 13,891 18,675 22,667 
Government Payments Required 
1966 Net Farm Income 2,362 0 0 
1968 Net Farm Income 1,251 0 0 
1969 Net Farm Income 2,637 0 0 
36 
Land Retirement Programs 
Estimated net farm income for the annual land retirement program 
includes government payments for participation. The $4.2 billion for 
price support and land retirement pushes net farm income above that 
for Level A prices and the actual 1968 level even though Comparison 
Level prices are below Level A prices (Table 8). However, if a long-
term land retirement program was implemented (with unrestricted land 
diversion with production located in areas of greatest comparative 
advantage), net income would total $16.6 billion, near the 1969 level, 
under the lower prices of the annual land retirement program. Es-
timated government payments to attain the implied amount and location 
of land retirement total $2.0 billion.23/ 
In summary, levels of net farm income realized in recent years 
could not be attained in 1975 solely through the mechanism of bar-
gaining power with prices at Level A (assuming mandatory production 
controls to restrain supply and no payments). Government payments still 
would be necessary if 1966-69 net farm income levels were to be attained. 
If Level B or Level C prices were attained under bargaining power pro-
grams alone, both would result in net farm income exceeding that of 
any previous year. No government payments would be required to 
attain these levels of income but effective means of reducing supply 
to the levels consistent with Level B and Level C prices definitely 
would be required. A price level somewhere between Level A and Level 
B would yield net incomes at either the 1966 or 1969 level without 
supplemental government payments. 
If prices lower than Level A were used, an annual land retirement 
program such as that summarized in the last column of Table 8 could 
be employed. This annual program has government payments totaling 
$4.2 billion and net farm income of $15.6 billion for 1975. Annual 
land retirement, long-term land retirement or a combination of the 
23/ Madsen, Heady and Nicol, Trade-Qffs in Farm Policy. If net 
farm income and expenses for this long-term land retirement 
program were recalculated using the methods of this present 
study, net farm income would be reduced and probably would be 
more in line with the annual land retirement program. 
--------------------------------
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two programs could be used to support prices at any of the levels 
reported in Table 8.~/ For bargaining power with mandatory acreage 
quotas used alone to attain the price level of the annual land 
retirement program in Table 8, net farm income is estimated at only 
$11.4 billion. A lower income results because no government payments 
are included. The annual land retirement program would result in the 
same price level but higher net farm income because, as has been 
true for programs of the recent past, it includes a government outlay 
for farmers of $4.2 billion as the necessary payments for voluntary 
participation. Hence, bargaining power that results in prices 
approaching those of the recent past (Table 1) still would require 
supplemental government payments to maintain net farm income. 
Additional Programs 
Various types of voluntary land retirement programs, with govern-
ment payments to attain sufficient participation and supply control, 
also could be used to attain the A, B and C price levels in Table 8. 
An annual land retirement program used to attain Level A prices 
would require government payments estimated at $5.5 billion in 1975. 
However, net farm income would be higher than for Level A prices with 
supply control through mandatory acreage quotas, since government 
payments are not included in the assumptions of the bargaining power 
program. Under a long-term retirement program analyzed elsewhere to 
include (a) unrestricted land diversion (whole farms and regions 
allowed), (b) land diversion in terms of comparative advantage and 
(c) Level A prices, net income is estimated at $18.5 billion.~/ 
Government payments estimated at $4.1 billion would be used, however, 
to attain voluntary participation of supply control consistent with 
Level A prices. Hence, a supply control program to allow attainment 
of a given level of prices will have more income associated with it 
24/ For an analysis of the effects when excess cropland is grazed 
for additional beef production, see Earl 0. Heady, Howard C. 
Madsen and Leo V. Mayer, Analysis of Some Farm Program Alternatives 
for the Future, CAED Rpt. 34, Center for Agricultural and Economic 
Development, Iowa State Univ., 1969. 
25/ Madsen, Heady and Nicol, Trade-Offs in Farm Policy. 
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when organized as (a) a voluntary acreage reduction program with 
government payments rather than as (b) a bargaining power program 
based on mandatory supply control and without payments. On the 
other hand, bargaining power exercised to the extent of control 
attaining Level B and Level C prices would increase income greatly 
without government payments. Income would be increased in these 
instances with the source being only that of higher prices for 
food. Under voluntary supply control and its associated payments 
to attain the same level of prices, the total social costs would 
be greater. Not only is the price of food raised by the same 
amount to consumers but also large treasury payments are required 
to attain the necessary participation level. 
CONSUMER EFFECTS 
Total consumer food expenditures associated with each of the 
three price levels are summarized in Table 10.26/ Estimated total 
food costs in 1975 range from $121 billion under Comparison Level 
prices to $137 billion under Level C prices.27/ Actual food costs 
were $83 billion in 1966 and $89 billion in 1969 but costs are 
expected to be higher in the future, regardless of the programs in 
effect. The increase is due to a larger population and growing 
per capita incomes and greater expenditures on food, especially 
for the service and convenience components of food. 
Alternative Price Levels and Food Costs 
Food cost per capita is lowest under Comparison Level prices, 
$544, and highest under Level C prices, $617. However, the increase 
in food cost per capita between Comparison Level and Level C prices 
is only $73 or 13.4 percent, but would bring these percentage in-
creases in farm commodity prices: 66.7 percent for corn, 76.0 percent 
for wheat, 74.4 percent for soybeans, 55.6 percent for cattle and 
calves and 81.3 percent for hogs. Hence, a rather modest increase in 
per capita food costs, and one only comparable to the growing outlay 
as consumers voluntarily elect to spend more for packaging or other 
conveniences and services incorporated with food, can bring a much 
26/ See Appendix B for methods used to calculate food costs. 
~/ The Comparison Level prices are the same as used for the 
annual land retirement program in Table 8. 
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40 
larger increase in farm prices. Also, the Level C prices would in-
crease net farm income by 45.6 percent over the Comparison Level 
prices (annual land retirement). 
In absolute terms, the increase in net farm income between Com-
parison Level and Level C prices is $7.1 billion. Total food cost 
rises $16,1 billion, more than twice the gain in net farm income. 
But net farm income under Comparison Level prices includes $4.2 
billion in government payments. Under a successful bargaining power 
program and Level C prices, government payments are eliminated. 
Food cost per capita increases $21 or 3.9 percent between Com-
parison Level and Level A prices. But net farm income under Level 
A prices is below that for Comparison Level prices. From a total 
food cost and net farm income standpoint, consumers, taxpayers and 
farmers all would prefer the Comparison Level prices with net farm 
income of $15.6 billion and total food cost of $120.6 billion. 
Under Level A prices, net farm income is $1.7 billion less and total 
food cost is $4.6 billion more. Under Comparison Level prices, 
farmers have a higher net farm income and consumers and taxpayers save 
$0.4 billion or the difference between the savings in food costs 
($4.6 billion) and higher government payments ($4.2 billion). 
Between Comparison Level and Level B prices, net farm income and 
total food cost increase by $3.1 billion (20.2 percent) and $10.1 
billion (8.5 percent), respectively. Although the gain in net farm 
income (over Comparison Level prices) is more modest under Level 
B prices than under Level C prices, the rise in total food cost 
is also much more modest. A bargaining power program that achieved 
a price level somewhere between Level A and Level B prices could 
maintain net farm income at the same level as under Comparison 
Level prices at even a more modest increase in total or per capita 
food cost than occurs under Level B prices. Also, government pay-
ments would not be required for participation. But the rise in total 
food cost, even though modest, would exceed the savings in govern-
ment payments ($4.2 billion for Comparison Level prices). 
Per capita food costs in 1975 will be higher than those of pre-
vious years, even with prices maintained at past levels, because 
of changes in consumption patterns associated with higher family 
incomes. As incomes of consumer rise, consumption is shifting away 
from pork, dairy products, eggs and grain products towards fresh 
fruits and vegetables, beef and veal, broilers and turkeys. Also, 
consumers respond rather flexibly in higher outlays for the service 
and convenience components of food as their incomes increase. The 
41 
projected costs in Table 10 reflect these shifts in consumption 
and lead to higher food costs in 1975 even with Comparison Level 
prices. 
Some Trade-Offs 
As discussed in the subsection on net farm income, a number of 
programs or methods could be used to attain specified or desired 
income or price levels. Included are farmer bargaining power, 
annual land retirement, long-term land retirement, government pur-
chase of excess cropland or a combination of these and other pro-
grams.28/ If the goal of policy makers is to maintain net farm 
income at a desired level, any of these programs can be used and 
the degree of supply control attained, along with the level of 
government payments, will determine net farm income, consumer food 
cost and Treasury outlay. 
Hence, a number of trade~offs are possible in the nature and 
combination of farm programs that might be used to attain given 
levels of prices and (or) net farm incomes. A specific level of 
net farm income can be attained with lower levels of food costs 
and farm commodity prices and lower total social costs under a 
voluntary program that pays farmers for participating in supply 
control. Supply control and farm commodity prices can be less, 
for a given net farm income level, since part of net farm income 
is contributed through government payments. On the other hand, 
the total social costs for a given level of prices attained through 
voluntary supply control and government payments is greater than 
through bargained prices and mandatory supply control. For the 
program involving government payments, costs are involved in both, 
(a) the higher food prices to consumers and (b) government payments. 
Similarly, bargaining power to increase income could result in a 
lower level of food prices if it were attained in some combination 
with government payments to encourage participation in supply control 
activities. 
28/ For production and income effects of a government land purchase 
program, see Heady, Madsen and Mayer, An Analysis of Some Farm 
Program Alternatives for the Future. 
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Bargaining power as a means of attaining price and income goals 
can be successfully attained only if accompanied by effective 
supply control so that output conforms to demand at the implied 
price level. Supply control through government payments is easier 
to attain than mandatory output reduction through self-assigned 
quotas by farm organizations that must exercise controls over many 
thousands of producers dispersed over great geographic space. 
Even with general types of farm programs, various alternatives 
exist and have their trade-offs in quantities important to various 
social, economic and geographic groups of the farm and general 
public. For example, land retirement can vary from (1) programs 
such as those of the recent past where contracts are on an annual 
basis and land diversion is on a fractional-farm basis spread 
over all producing regions, to (2) long-term land diversion con-
centrated regionally in terms of comparative advantage and on a 
whole-farm basis. Programs between these extremes also are possible. 
The costs of land retirement based on the first extreme require 
greater government payments than supply control based on the second 
extreme, even though the.two result in the same levels of price and 
aggregate income for agriculture. The second extreme, however, 
implies greater social and community costs than the first, if applied 
during a short period, because it would cause the costs of adjust-
ment to concentrate in particular localities and communities.29/ 
Each approach to farm policy has its gain in one direction and 
sacrifice in another. It is these gains and losses that farm 
communities, farm groups, program administrators and the public at 
large must weigh in choosing one or another program or in choosing 
a combination of two or more. It is possible that the general 
public would be unwilling to provide government payments at the 
level necessary to bring farm prices and net farm income to Level 
C indicated in the preceding analysis. As voluntary supply control 
is achieved through government payments, the costs increase as prices 
go higher, more productive land must be diverted and higher market 
29/ For a discussion of regional adjustment problems under alter-
native farm programs, see Madsen, Heady and Nicol, Trade-Offs 
in Farm Policy; Heady,Madsen and Mayer, An Analysis of Some 
Farm Program Alternatives for the Future and Leo V. Mayer, Earl 
0. Heady and Howard C. Madsen, Farm Programs for the 1970's, 
CAED Rpt. 32, Center for Agricultural and Economic Development, 
Iowa State Univ., 1968. 
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returns cause participation to become less favorable for individual 
farmers. It is possible, since high Treasury payments would not 
also be involved, that the higher level~ of farm prices would be 
more acceptable to the general public if attained through farmer 
bargaining mechanisms that controlled supply without payments. This 
route to higher prices would differ little, if any, from attainment 
of the same goal by industries, such as those represented by auto-
mobiles, farm machinery and steel. The problem of effective supply 
control, however, is the major obstacle to be surmounted by farmer 
self-managed programs. Sizable price improvements themselves provide 
incentive for farmers to break away from schemes organized for this 
purpose. 
These and other considerations must be used by farmers, the 
public, rural communities, consumers and public administrators in 
selecting optimal or acceptable policies. This study has been made 
to provide added information on which these decisions might be 
based. 0nly the groups affected by the many trade-offs among alter-
native policy and price improvement schemes can determine the appro-
priate weights to be applied to each. However, quantities relating 
to the costs, price and income effects must be gauged against these 
weights in arriving at efficient decisions. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
The need for and potentials in agricultural policy revolve 
around a number of factors. First, the demand for farm products 
is inelastic and rapidly expanding farm output keeps farm prices 
and income from rising. Second, because of the spatial charac-
teristics of farming, rural communities typically provide few at-
hand nonfarm employment opportunities for persons being released 
rapidly from the industry. Third, educational facilities in the 
past have not been greatly geared to human adaptation and mobility 
in rural communities. Fourth, the labor market connecting agri-
culture with the rest of the economy has functioned imperfectly 
and with great lagged effects.30/ 
30/ For a discussion of these factors and the role of agriculture 
in economic development, See Earl 0. Heady, Agricultural Policy 
Under Economic Development, Ames, Iowa State Univ. Press, 1962; 
Leo V. Mayer, Earl 0. Heady and Howard C. Madsen, Farm Programs 
for the 1970's, CAED Rpt. 32, Center for Agricultural and 
Economic Development, Iowa State Univ., 1968, and Earl 0. Heady, 
A Primer on Food, Agriculture and Public Policy, New York, Random 
House, 1967. 
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Obviously, differences between bargaining power achieved through 
mandatory controls or land retirement by annual or long-term pro-
grams or other program alternatives are not "black and white" that 
alone can solve or meet all of these basic problems. Each program 
alternative has associated with it (1) a different amount and lo-
cation of retired cropland and production or supply control~ (2) 
varying geographic and economic distributions of government payments 
or income improvements and (3) large differences with regional lo-
cation of agricultural adjustments. Accordingly, the choice among 
farm program alternatives need not be one of "either, or." A com-
bination or mix of farm programs can greatly affect government costs, 
the time involved for solutions or adjustments and the location of 
land retirement. 
The analysis of some potential bargaining power price levels in 
this study represents an attempt to provide data to which farm 
groups, the public and policy makers can attach their own weights 
in arriving at program choices. If any of these groups should de-
cide that no government payments to farmers are desired, net farm 
income can be maintained at past levels only with prices substan-
tially above present levels and with correspondingly higher food 
prices. Bargaining power alone, which holds farm prices only at 
previous levels, would result in reduced net farm income under 
the elimination of government payments to farmers for supply con-
trol. With rather modest increases in per capita food costs, bar-
gaining power that in fact incorporated effective supply control 
could result in very sizable increases in farm prices and income --
if the supply control implied were acceptable to farmers and "tight" 
enough. 
Although supply control and higher prices through market bar-
gaining or government administered programs could bring net farm 
income to the levels preferred by particular farm groups, programs 
centering around commodity prices provide no effective compensation 
for the many persons replaced from farming by rapidly changing tech-
nology. The use of more capital and technology through the decisions 
of individual farmers has brought rapid expansion in farm size and 
the process is continuing. A complete social policy for the entire 
rural community is needed to solve their problems. Both farm and 
nonfarm rural persons should be included since both are victims of 
the rapid technological changes under way in agriculture. Farmers, 
society and industry continue investing in technology which increases 
the supply capacity of agriculture. As illustrated in Table 11, 
the ongoing technological transformation of agriculture allowed 
total output to increase with reduced employment of cropland and 
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labor. New forms of capital technology have substituted for these 
resources and increased the productivity of farming.l!/ These 
trends will continue. 
With ongoing investments in new technological forms of capital, 
change is continuous and has differential effects on various groups 
in rural communities. Whether through alternative land retirement 
programs financed by the government or farmer bargaining programs 
that control supply without government participation, programs 
could be organized to free or add funds that then might be directed 
towards persons of the rural community who bear the truly great 
burden of change through loss of employment opportunities and 
income. Savings generated through particular program modifications 
could be used, along with additional funds to guarantee improved 
education, training, career guidance and employment generation in 
rural areas. More people then could be afforded positive economic 
opportunity.B_/ Bargaining power with effective supply control 
as the means of price and income improvement could allow funds to 
be released for these purposes. The problem of inherent, excess 
supply capacity in agriculture would still not be solved by bar-
gaining power programs that give farmers control over their prices. 
But bargaining power programs could place farmers more nearly on 
a parallel with other industries where producers are not "price 
takers." 
1!1 For a more detailed explanation of these forces and problems, 
see Earl 0. Heady, Agricultural Policy Under Economic Develop-
ment, Ames, Iowa State Univ. Press, 1962. Also see Leo V. Mayer, 
Earl 0. Heady and Howard C. Madsen, Farm Programs for the 1970's, 
CAED Rpt. 32, Center for Agricultural and Economic Development, 
Iowa State Univ., 1968, and Earl 0. Heady, A Primer on Food, 
Agriculture and Public Policy, New York, Random House, 1967. 
32/ For a discussion of the gains and losses under technological 
change and suggested programs for farm and nonfarm people in 
the rural community, see Earl 0. Heady, "Developing Economic-
ally and Politically Consistent Policies: The Problem of 
Equity," in Food Goals, Future Structural Changes, and Agri-
cultural Policy: A National Basebook, Ames, Iowa State Univ. 
Press, 1969. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study is one in a continuing series dealing with alter-
native farm policies. It includes simulation of a bargaining 
power program to attain three·alternative price levels: Level A 
($1.50 wheat, $1.25 corn and $2.75 soybeans), Level B ($1.85 
wheat, $1.50 corn and $3.25 soybeans) and Level C ($2.20 wheat, 
$1.75 corn and $3.75 soybeans). A fourth price level ($1.25 wheat, 
$1.05 corn and $2.15 soybeans), termed the Comparison Level, is 
included in parts of the analysis for comparison. Commodities in-
cluded in the analysis are wheat, feed grains, soybeans, cotton, 
cattle and calves, hogs, sheep, broilers and turkeys. The year 
1975 is used as the time reference of the study. 
The primary objective of this study is to estimate net farm 
income, food cost and supply control required under simulated bar-
gal.nl.ng pm·rer programs to attain the three alternative price levels. 
The study also attempts to answer these questions: (a) What level 
of prices for the major agricultural products is required to main-
tain producer net income at recent year levels when government 
price support and acreage diversion payments are eliminated? 
(b) What level of government transfer payments is required, for 
alternative price levels, to maintain producer net income at 
recent year levels? The price levels chosen are not recommended 
levels but have been selected, among the many possible, to indicate 
considerations involved in using bargaining power to attain var-
ious price levels for major agricultural commodities. 
A successful bargaining power program would require effective 
means to restrain supply to market demand at higher price levels. 
Since the demand for most farm commodities is inelastic, an in-
crease in farm prices will increase aggregate farm income. But 
when farm prices rise, there is more incentive for farmers to in-
crease output. Market demand quantities move in the reverse dir-
ection, decreasing as prices rise. And the higher prices rise, the 
tighter must be the restraints on production. For example, to 
achieve Level A prices in 1975, which are above the 1966-69 average 
level, total feed grains acres are 2.6 million fewer than the 1969 
actual acreage. And in 1969 about 59.0 million acres were retired 
in various land retirement programs. Under Level C prices, the 
highest price level studied, feed grains acres must be reduced 19.1 
million (20.0 percent) below 1969 actual or 16.5 million fewer 
acres than under Level A prices. Similar changes are evident for 
soybeans. To achieve Level A prices, total soybean acres must be 
reduced 4.5 million below 1969 actual. To achieve Level C prices, 
soybean acres must be reduced 15.2 million (37.2 percent) below 
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1969 actual or 10.7 million fewer acres than under Level A prices. 
The control levels implied could lead to a successful bargaining 
power program for agriculture, although supply control implemented 
without government land retirement programs would require legal 
authority and mechanisms that do not exist. Because of the nature 
of demand, however, a- successful bargaining power program could 
raise net farm income. Income gains for farmers could be very 
substantial if supply were reduced so that prices were raised as 
much as 70 percent above the 1966-69 average. For the price levels 
included in this study, net farm income ranges from $13.9 billion 
under Level A prices, in the absence of government price support 
and land retirement payments to farmers, to $22.7 billion under 
Level C prices. 
Since net farm income (in the absence of government payments) 
under Level A prices in 1975 is below the average 1966-69 level, 
government payments would be required to maintain the 1966-69 levels. 
Under Level A prices, net farm income could be maintained at the 
1966 level only with government payments to farmers of $2.4 billion; 
to maintain net farm incomes at the 1968 level would require govern-
ment payments of $1.3 billion and at the 1969 level payments of 
$2.6 billion. Net farm incomes under both Level B and Level C 
prices are above those of all previous years. Therefore, a bar-
gaining power program that achieved a price level somewhere between 
Level A and Level B could maintain net farm income at the 1966, 
1968 or 1969 level without government subsidy payments. 
Net farm income for Comparison Level prices ($1.25 wheat, 
$1.05 corn and $2.15 soybeans), with an annual land retirement 
program financed by the government, is estimated at $15.6 billion 
and is above that of Level A prices, a simulated bargaining power 
program without government payments. But, the annual land retire-
ment program for Comparison Level prices includes $4.2 billion in 
payments, with prices and payment rates structured as in recent 
years. Of course, bargaining power also could be used to maintain 
prices below Level A, but net farm income would be correspondingly 
lower (about $11.4 billion for the Comparison Level prices). 
It is evident that with a bargaining power program and lower 
prices, such as Level A or those of recent years, net farm income 
would not increase. Such a program would only replace the supply 
control effects of present government programs and Treasury payments 
to farmers would be eliminated. With higher prices, such as those 
represented by Level C, net farm income is increased even without 
government payments. The price increase more than offsets the 
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elimination of government payments. 
payments are not required under this 
ports of farm products are projected 
rise modestly as prices increase. 
-------------
Although government subsidy 
bargaining power program, ex-
to decline and food costs to 
Food cost per capita for 1975 is lowest under Comparison Level 
prices, $544, and highest under Level C prices, $617. But farm prices 
and net farm income under Level C prices are substantially above 
similar measures for Comparison Level prices. In other words, the 
higher price level results in farm prices averaging 70 percent higher 
and net farm income 46 percent higher with an increase in total food 
costs of only 13.4 percent over Comparison Level prices. In absolute 
terms, the increase in net farm income between Comparison Level and 
Level C prices is $7.1 billion. Total food costs rise $16.1 billion, 
more than twice the gain in net farm income. At the same time, net 
farm income for the Comparison Level prices includes $4.2 in govern-
ment price support and land retirement payments. With a successful 
bargaining power program, these payments are eliminated. 
For Level A and Level B prices the increase in total or per capita 
food cost is much more modest (over Comparison Level prices), although 
the increase in total food cost under both Level A and Level B 
prices is more than the amount of government payments under Comparison 
Level prices ($4.2 billion for an annual land retirement program). 
Net farm income under Level A prices, however, is $1.7 billion less 
and under Level B prices, net farm income is $3.1 billion or 20.0 
percent more than under Comparison Level prices. A price level 
somewhere between Level A and Level B prices could maintain net 
farm income at the same level as under Comparison Level prices but the 
rise in total food cost, even though modest, would exceed the amount 
of government payments under Comparison Level prices (an annual land 
retirement program). 
The effects of a given program on the farm price level, net farm 
income and food cost depend on the nature of the program or the 
combination of programs that might be used. Supply control through 
a government program that includes payments for participation can 
attain a given level of net income with lower prices, lower food 
costs and lower total social costs, where costs are represented by 
lower prices to consumers but higher payments from the Treasury. 
A higher level of prices and food costs is implied for the same 
net farm income under a bargaining power program, and the total 
social costs are higher where costs entail only the higher food 
prices to consumers. But the increase in total food costs under a 
successful bargaining power program will always exceed the savings 
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in Treasury payments from elimination of the government payment 
program. 
On the other hand, total social costs to attain a given level 
of prices are always more for supply control through government 
programs and payments because the price of food is raised by the 
same amount to consumers and large Treasury payments are required 
to attain the necessary participation. Under a successful bargaining 
power program, only the total cost of food is higher. 
Land retirement programs of the recent past have an advantage 
in the sense that they spread the burden of land retirement over 
the entire country. A mandatory supply control program of the type 
implied in this study and necessary for a successful bargaining 
power program to increase net farm income, would have this same 
advantage since acreage quotas used are based on historical acreages 
of the major crops. However, long-run supply control and considerably 
higher prices under a bargaining power program would encounter certain 
major difficulties. These include: 
1. The large number and the great geographical dispersion of 
producers make it difficult to maintain discipline and to 
administer controls. Some producers feed the grains, others 
sell and some do both, making policing difficult. 
2. Pressures to bring new lands into production as supply 
controls are tightened and the price level rises are always 
in the background. 
3. Depending on the price level attained, there might be in-
centive to develop new products as substitutes for those 
being controlled. 
4. Adverse effects on foreign trade, both in reducing exports 
and in increasing imports as the price level is increased, 
are imminent prospects. 
5. Adequate controls must exist to prevent producers outside 
the bargaining framework from supplying the market. Hence, 
an increasing degree of monopoly power must be attained by 
farmers as production controls are tightened and prices are 
raised further. 
6. Reducing eventual market supply of some agricultural prod-
ucts is difficult. Animals continue to grow and production 
is continuous over a holding period. Hence, supply control 
best may come through restraints in planting and breeding. 
7. Members of the bargaining groups must be able to withstand 
financial hardships if a "strike" is called. Since un-
employment payments available to labor unions do not exist 
for agricultural producers, many· producers could not afford 
this financial loss unless substitute mechanisms were 
developed. 
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8. Present laws do not exempt agricultural producers from 
antitrust legislation if prices are raised too high. 
A number of alternative methods, prcgrams or combinations of 
programs could be used to attain a desired price or income goal: 
farmer bargaining programs, annual land diversion programs, long-
term land retirement programs, government purchase of excess crop-
land and others. Any of these programs can be used and the degree 
of supply control exerted, along with the level of government pay-
ments forthcoming, will determine net farm income and consumer 
food cost. Each program has associated with it a different free-
dom of decision, location of retired cropland, geographic distri-
bution of government payments and income, and regional location of 
agricultural adjustments. It is information on these effects that 
policy makers and the general public should use to decide on the 
desired program or combination of programs. The magnitude of the 
trade-offs involved among different programs and the weights that 
farmers, government administrators and the general public attach 
to attainments of each provide the parameters needed for improved 
policy decisions. 
-----------------------
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APPENDIXES 
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APPENDIX A 
Total production expenses are equal to cash plus fixed ex-
penses. Cash expenses include: feed costs, livestock purchases, 
fertilizer and seed, petroleum and fuel, building repairs, hired 
labor, other vehicle operation and miscellaneous costs. Fixed 
expenses include: depreciation on buildings and equipment, taxes, 
interest on real estate and rent. No formal methods were used 
to estimate fixed expenses in this study. Equations 1 through 7 
were used to estimate cash expenses: 
Feed Costs (t value in parentheses) 
-24,594.472 + 299.680QLt- 203.196QC _1 + 212.480QCt-1 (-2.87) (3.04) (-1.97) t (2.32)Q1 t 
F Ratio = 81.58 
R2 = 0.94 
Livestock Purchases 
YLPt = -1514.196 + 15.633QLt- 1 + 33.195QC (2.98) (1.62) (5.74) t 
F Ratio = 105.42 
R2 = 0.92 
Fertilizer and Seed 
Y = -285.007 + 0.922YF S _1 + 8.485T 
F,St (1.19) (9.01) ' t (1.22) 
F Ratio = 395.36 
R2 = 0.98 
~etroleum and Fuel 
Y = 392.163 + 0.658Yp F _1 + 2.197T 
P,Ft (2.48) (4.38) ' t (1.60) 
F Ratio = 72.29 
R2 = 0.89 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Other Vehicle Operation 
No equation estimated 
Building Repairs 
"' 
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y 
BRt 690.078 + 0.528YBRt- 1 - 5,814T 
(5) 
(2.87) (3.05) (-3.01) 
F Ratio = 152.85 
2 R = 0.95 
Hired Labor 
Y = 2437.559 + 0.752Y1 _ 1 - 27.356T 
Lt (1.49) (5.07) t (-1.50) 
F Ratio = 320.02 
R2 = 0.97 
Miscellaneous Cost 
Y =- 1031.280 + 0.831YM _1 + 27.420T 
Mt (-1.94) (7.44) t (1.95) 
F Ratio 
R2 = 0.99 
where 
12114.00 
Index of livestock production, 1966=100, 
by adding together liveweight production 
calves, hogs and sheep. 
Lagged value of Q1 t 
Constructed 
of cattle and 
Index of crop production, 1966=100. 
adding together feed units of wheat, 
soybeans produced. 
Constructed by 
feed grains and 
Lagged value of QCt 
T Time; 49, 50, •.•. , 69. 
(6) 
(7) 
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Equations 1 and 2 were estimated from 1949-69 data while equa-
tions 3 through 7 were based on 1950-1969. Appendix Table A-1 
summarizes actual values for each of the dependent variables in 
equations 1 through 7, their total for the years 1950-1969 and the 
predicted total for 1950-1969. 
Costs estimated for 1975 from equations 1 and 2 were obtained 
by placing estimates of crop and livestock production for 1975 into 
the right hand sides of the equations and obtaining resulting es-
timates on the left hand sides. For equations 3 through 7, starting 
with 1969 values of each variable and T = 70 on the right hand sides 
of the equations, estimates for the left hand sides in 1970 were 
, obtained. These estimates for 1970 and T = 71 were then used to 
obtain estimates for 1971. The process stopped when the estimates 
for 1975 were obtained. 
The estimate for total cash expenses in 1975 is then the adding 
together of each individual cost estimate from equations 1 through 7 
for each price level studied, plus other vehicle operation at its 
mean value 1949-1969. 
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APPENDIX B 
Total food costs were estimated from projections to 1975 of 
individual food items including beef and veal, pork, lamb and mutton, 
broilers, turkeys, eggs, dairy products, fruits and vegetables, grain 
mill products, bakery products and miscellaneous items. 
Consumer expenditures in 1975 for beef and veal, pork, lamb and 
mutton, broilers, turkeys and eggs were estimated from Equation 1: 
(1) 
where 
Ei 75 =Consumer expenditure for i-th commodity in 1975 i = 1, .•.• , 6 
p iR75 
ci75 
N75 
= Retail prices of i-th commodity in 1975 in 1966 equivalent 
dollars 
= Per capita consumption of i-th commodity in 1975 
Population estimate for 1975 
Consumer expenditure for dairy products was estimated from 
Equation 2: 
E d75 = (E d66) G:~) G ~:~~ (::~) (2} 
where 
Ed75 
Ed66 = 
c75 
c66 
PI75 
PI66 
N75 
N66 
= 
Consumer expenditure for dairy products in 1975 
Consumer expenditures for dairy products in 1966 
Per capita consumption of all dairy products in 1975 
divided by actual 1966 
Consumer price index for all dairy products in 1975 
divided by actual 1966 
Population estimate for 1975 divided by actual 1966. 
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Expenditures for fruits and vegetables, grain mill products, 
bakery products and miscellaneous food costs were estimated from 
Equation 3: 
where 
1'1C = E 
Consumer expenditure for j-th commodity group in 1975 
j=1, .•• ,4 
Average per capita change in consumer expenditure for 
j-th commodity group, 1960-68 
(3) 
Average per capita consumer expenditure for j-th commod-
ity group 1960-68 
Population estimate for 1975 
-- Number of years (1964-1975) 
Appendix Table B-1 gives estimates for each commodity estimated 
from Equations 1, 2 and 3. 
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Appendix Table B-1. Estimated consumer expenditures for individual 
commodities under alternative price levels in 
1975 ·2:.' 
1975 Prices 
Level Level Level Comparison 
Item A B c Level 
(Million Dollars) 
Meat Products 53,182 57,260 61,719 49,498 
Beef and Veal 36,816 39,295 41,951 34,641 
Pork 14,987 16,622 18,390 13,572 
Lamb and Mutton 1,379 1,343 1,378 1,285 
Poultr:l: !lnd t:~~s 9,130 10,556 12,099 8,187 
Broilers 5,328 6,594 7,981 4,485 
Turkeys 1,052 1,212 1,368 952 
Eggs 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,750 
Dairl Products 13,828 13,828 13,828 13,828 
Other 49,112 49' 112 49' 112 49,112 
Fruits & Vegetables 24,123 24,123 24,123 24,123 
Grain Mill Products 3,943 3,943 3,943 3,943 
Bakery Products 10,092 10,092 10,092 10,092 
Miscellaneous 10,954 10,954 10,954 10,954 
TOTAL 125,252 130,756 136,758 120,625 
2;./ All values are measured in 1966 equivalent dollars with no adjust-
ment for inflation to 1975: Level A - Corn @$1.25 per bushel, 
wheat @$1.50 per bushel, soybeans @$2.75 per bushel; cattle and 
calves @24.0 cents per pound, hogs @20.0 cents per pound, broilers 
@17.0 cents per pound and lambs @22.0 cents per pound. Level B-
Corn @$1.50 per bushel, wheat @$1.85 per bushel and soybeans 
@$3.25 per bushel; cattle and calves @30.0 cents per pound, hogs 
@27.0 cents per pound, broilers @22.0 cents per pound and lambs 
@28.0 cents per pound. Level C- Corn @$1.75 per bushel, wheat 
@$2.20 per bushel and soybeans @$3.75 per bushel; cattle and calves 
@35.0 cents per pound, hogs @33.0 cents per pound, broilers @28.0 
cents per pound and lambs @35.0 cents per pound. Comparison Level -
Corn @$1.05 per bushel, wheat @$1.25 per bushel and soybeans 
@$2.15 per bushel; cattle and calves @22.5 cents per pound, hogs 
@18.2 cents per pound and broilers @15.3 cents per pound. 
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APPENDIX C 
This study is based on a linear programming model with 150 pro-
ducing regions and 31 demand or consuming regions. Production of 
wheat, feed grains, soybeans and cotton is included explicitly in 
the model. Livestock production is converted into feed equivalents 
and incorporated implicitly. Given a set of crop prices, crop pro-
duction costs and transportation costs, the programming model 
maximizes the net return of farmers subject to: (a) cropland avail-
able, (b) demands estimated for the given prices and (c) acreage 
quotas necessary to restrain supplies to the estimated demands. 
In abbreviated form, the programming model can be shown as: 
Maximize f(r) = rx' (1) 
where the x's are subject to the restraints 
Ax' < b' 
X > 0 
(2) 
(3) 
Maximizing (1), there exists a set of x's (levels of production, 
transportation and transfer of wheat for feed) that will satisfy 
the restraints (2) on cropland available, estimated demands, and 
acreage quotas to restrain supplies to estimated demands. When 
this model is solved for a unique x, the acreage and location of 
wheat, feed grains, soybeans and cotton in the 150 producing regions 
are specified. 
